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ABSTRACT
T his paper exam ines the effect on industry
output of union density both conceptually and
empirically in the ca se of the Australian
Building and C onstruction industry. T he
classical view of th e effects of a heavily
unionised industry is th at by exhibiting som e
m arket power, unions are able to extract
above normal ren ts and cau se industrial
disruption, w hich is reflected in lower
industry employment and higher wages. More
contem porary beliefs describing the effect of
unions concentrates on issu es related to the
external information benefits provided by
union m ovem ents. By voicing information
related to exit, it is argued th at th e resulting
lower labour turnover and other related co sts
dominate possible higher wage and lower
employment outcom es supposedly generated
by heavily unionised sectors.
Empirical
evidence from Australia in the case of the
heavily unionised Building and Construction
industry, does not support the classical view
th at higher union density inhibits th e output
perform ance of the industry in the long run.
The estim ates also reveal a quick path to long
run equilibrium.

1. INTRODUCTION
The classical literature argues that more intense union involvement
in an industry, by introducing monopoly power on the supplyside of the labour market, has the effect of restricting employment
and allowing higher wages than would be the case under the
competitive outcome (see for instance, Friedman & Friedman
1962, pp. 123-5 and the discussions of Bok & Dunlop 1970, pp.
260-1 or Kerr 1957). In addition, by pursuing what is perceived
(by employers) to be above-normal work conditions the possible
industrial disputation which follows is costly to the industry
causing loss in output and declining profits. However, more recent
literature in this area including Hirschman (1970), Clark (1984),
Freedman and Medoff (1984), Hirsch and Link (1984), Hirsch
(1987), argue that the classical model neglects to incorporate
some of the information-related benefits which union movements
provide, such as those benefits which stem from exit and voice
behaviour. Such behaviour, to be elaborated on further in section
2, includes the ability of a union to provide cost savings for the
firm by restricting labour turnover, and by disseminating
information on work-related issues such as conditions, specific
job tasks, workplace hazards, and more productive work
practices, in a coherent, centralised, and organised way. By
including such behavioural advantages of unions in an analysis of
union effects, the benefits to workplace productivity may
dominate the obvious wage, employment and industrial
disputation costs, thus allowing unions to be a net advantage to
industry.
In order to provide evidence of the connection between union
density and industrial performance, we conduct a time series,
regression-based empirical investigation of the Australian
Building and Construction (ABC) industry; an industry which is
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characterised by heavy union involvement. The empirical
investigation will take place over the early 1980's to the mid
1990's using quarterly data. This empirical approach is unique in
the literature since it examines the time series properties of
regression arguments, while also testing for the existence of long
run relationships. This uniqueness stems from the fact that most
papers discussing the union density/output nexus were written
well before these techniques were standard. This paper is also a
contribution to the literature by virtue of the arguments used to
explain industry output apart from union density. Explanatory
variables such as Gross Domestic Product, input prices, interest
rates on loans borrowed for housing construction purposes,
together, have rarely been employed in the literature with some
exceptions (to be noted in Section 2). This paper also examines
the short run adjustment to equilibrium by using the Engle-Granger
two step procedure, another unique feature of the paper.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2
presents some theoretical aspects of the relationship between
union density and industry output, as well as reviewing the
empirical literature. Section 3 introduces the data set and the
specification used for investigation of the abovementioned
relationship, while Section 4 discusses the empirical results in the
context of the salient features of the ABC industry. The final
section concludes the paper.
2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW
The Theoretical Literature
In the classical literature it is argued that a competitive labour
market will realise a lower wage and higher employment outcome
than would be the case had the market been characterised by
imperfections on the supply side, particularly in the case of
labour union-induced imperfections. This also implies that the
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performance of the industry will also suffer through lower output
and profits. The standard reasons why this may be the case
include; (i) labour union actions which shift the demand and
supply curves for labour, (especially in the case of craft labour
unions) for the benefit of members, (ii) cohesive labour unions
may bargain directly for settlements which substantially exceed
the offer of firms, and (iii) large industrial labour unions have
significant relative bargaining strength. In this latter case unions
are able to have collective bargains extended to cover both
unionised and non-unionised sectors through the award system
and by the use of pattern agreements in the enterprise bargaining
sphere.
Recent models of union behaviour and their effects on
industrial performance focus on the cost savings that may be
achieved due to the presence of unions. Hirschman (and later
Freeman and Medoff) argues that union v oice behaviour can be
an important source of cost saving for the firm as ex it behaviour
may be reduced, although it is still admitted that additional costs
associated with unions exist. Characterisation of voice and exit
behaviour originated with the contribution of Hirschman (1970),
in which the narrow view of the classical school is broadened in
order to account for voice and exit.
The concept of exit is based on the idea that each worker has
a clear perception of how they are being treated in the workplace.
If their perceived treatment is favourable, that is, their wages and
working conditions are, presumably, at least comparable to their
next best alternative employment, the worker will remain with the
firm. By remaining, this is a reflection of the satisfaction of a
worker with his or her employer, which is information that is
quickly disseminated to other employees, thus the firm obtains a
reputation of prioritising the welfare of workers. Conversely, a
worker who believes they are receiving a relatively unfair deal is
reflected in him or her leaving the firm. The firm's reputation is

- 3 -

tarnished in the eyes of both incumbent and prospective
employees. However, this is not the only cost borne by the firm.
When an employee leaves, the employer suffers pecuniarily by
virtue of labour turnover and related costs such as recruiting new
employees, and the (sunk) loss of employees which carry skills
and training financed by the firm.
The concept of v oice follows directly from the notion of exit.
As the name suggests, voice represents the preferences of
employees which are often directed through formal representative
bodies (usually unions) or through established grievance
procedures. By allowing the employer advanced knowledge of the
views of employees before they exit, the firm may be able to
remedy wages and conditions sufficiently to avoid exit, thus
saving employers from the associated exit costs. However, exit
costs are not the only costs which can be manifested in the
perceived unfair treatment of workers; industrial disputes,
shirking, poor quality control, lethargy, and pilferage may also be
a reflection of mistreatment. By providing cost savings for the
firm as a result of avoiding unnecessary strike activity, exit and
the rest, the union is able to improve profit, output and
productivity performances which may possibly dominate the
increase in costs likely to flow from higher wage demands.
Voice and exit do not exhaust the potential benefits to
employers of unions. Management may use unions as a focal
point through which all employees can be informed of changes to
the employment relationship. Unions will also discipline workers
if individuals or groups try to break from the union-management
deal. Additionally, by acting as a representative of employees,
unions are able to group the negotiations of all workers into one
process, rather than staggering individual wage claims within the
firm or enterprise.
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T h e Em pirical Literature

The aforementioned theoretical analysis invites an empirical
investigation of the effects of strong unions on industrial
performance. With most union/industrial performance analyses
having been undertaken in the US, three approaches appear to be
most favoured. Although the following is a far from exhaustive
detailing of all studies in the area, we believe that major strands
of research and results have been covered in the following.
The first approach is an aggregate study of all manufacturing
establishments (see for instance, Brown & Medoff 1978). This
method appears to be the least favoured, perhaps due to the
indiscriminate way in which it handles aggregated data from
what are essentially heterogeneous data collection points.
Stepping away from that fundamentally macro approach, a more
specific and popular method of investigation is employed which
involves industry-specific data. Addison and Hirsch (1989) refer
to studies based on this methodology as firm/business
econometric analyses (for representative examples, see Clark
1984; Hirsch & Connolly 1987; and Connolly, Hirsch & Hirschey
1986). These are by far the most prevalent forms of study into the
union effect/firm performance phenomena. The least used format
for investigation has been the specific case study based on a
single industry. Clark's (1980a, 1980b) studies into the cement
industry being an exception rather than a rule. Mandelstamm
writing in 1965 employed a localised industry study, although
this cannot be considered a forerunner to the investigations of the
1970's, 1980's and 1990's due to its non-reliance on a production
or cost function approach. Allen (1984, 1986) similarly has
concentrated his study on a specific industry, and it is perhaps at
this level that the greatest recognition of the problems associated
with aggregation have occurred. This follows from the fact that at
the level of an industry specific study, particular contextual
variables associated with a selected work, economic and
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industrial relations culture can be more readily identified.
Productivity and profitability have been the most celebrated
measure of firm performance of late, with few investigations
dealing specifically with the union effect on output. However
since output is an indicator of industry/firm performance, a
comparison of results, if not methodologies is a valid undertaking.
Turning to the productivity measure of firm performance, Allen
(1984, 1986), Mandelstamm (1965), Clark (1980a; 1980b), Brown
and Medoff (1978) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) all found a
positive union influence on productivity. Running counter to these
positive results and not previously cited are the outcomes
presented by Connerton, Freeman and Medoff (1983), Metcalf
(1988), Edwards (1987), Davies and Caves (1987) and Machin
(1987), with Machin concluding that unions can have both
positive and negative results depending upon the circumstances
(for a critical examination of the latter four, see Nolan &
Marginson 1990). Clearly, there is no distinct trend for all
circumstances. Market conditions, industrial relations processes
and 'culture', the type and location of production if not the
technologies used within it, all conspire to produce environments
in which no sure prediction can be made regarding the outcomes
of unions. Each situation must be dealt with individually.
Shifting our focus to the profitability measure of performance,
we find that Clark (1984), Hirsch and Connolly (1987), Connolly,
Hirsch and Hirschey (1986) and Becker and Olson (1992) (to cite
just a few of the studies in this area) have reported negative union
effects on firm/industry profits. Flowever some researchers have
uncovered, if not contradictory, then at least an unsecure tether
between the effects of organised labour and a firm or industry's
profit outcome. For example, Mandelstamm found there to be
little effect on profits regardless of the degree of unionisation and
of significance to this concept is Clark's (1984) mature
interpretation of the issue encapsulated by his statement that
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"(t)he large body of evidence on the union wage effect ... is not
sufficient to establish a union effect on profits" (p. 893).1
Unlike the American and British investigations into this field,
Australian research is relatively underdeveloped. Considering the
prevalence of union influence in Australian industry, and the
commonly held perception that unions are a intransigent entity in
the employment relationship which do nothing more than increase
costs and reduce employment opportunities, it is somewhat odd
that more research has not been undertaken.
Productivity analysis has been the area of most interest to
Australian researchers. Phipps and Sheen (1994) have attempted
to follow the Freeman and Medoff approach by using a
production function technique applied to the Australian
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS)
data.
Endeavouring to explain equilibrium output, they include supply
side variables (for example, capital stock and employment), along
with proxies of what constitute 'good' or 'bad' industrial
relations. By including these receptive indicators the authors have
attempted to counter a significant criticism of the Harvard model
as identified by Turnbull (1991). with the criticism centring on the
inability of the Harvard model to explain the industrial relations
environment. The inclusion of these indicators is quite reasonable
given that Metcalf came to the conclusion that the quality of
industrial relations is probably the main determinant of
productivity growth or decay, with Turnbull also conceding to
this dictum when he states that "most scholars would broadly
accept this proposition" (1991, p. 136). Freeman and Medoff also
resolutely support this notion when they cite studies which have

1 For a more complete summary of the international literatu re
dealing with union effects on firm performance debate, see the
tables presented in Addison and Hirsch (1989) and Freeman and
Medoff (1984).
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examined the link between the industrial relations climate and
productivity (1984, pp. 176-9). Where this study may have the
question of bias raised against it is in the failure to identify the
demand side variables which are important in explaining output.
Consideration of supply side variables only in explaining an
output measure which is driven by both demand and supply side
factors gives rise to concern over omitted variable bias in the
empirical investigation.
Moving away from the classical US production function
technique, Crockett et al (1992) and Drago and Wooden (1992)
chose to analyse the AWIRS data through the use of the Ordered
Probit estimation technique for relative productivity estimation.
The weakness of this investigation is that the data used for
productivity estimation is highly problematic. The data fails to
accurately represent the actual productivity change in firms due
to its reliance on perceptions of relative firm productivity
performance and how their productivity is affected by, amongst
other factors, labour market and labour usage restrictions as
observed by the managers of firms. Clearly such data is open to
the vagrancy's of subjective estimation, and thus any results
stemming from such a measure should be treated with caution. In
defence of the authors, they duly note the need for prudent
interpretation of the results given the problematic nature of their
data source.
Alexander and Green (1992) approach the study field from a
different perspective, relying on a range of performance indicators
which may be effected by an extensive agglomeration of
explanatory variables, including productivity, ability of the firm
to change, output quality and/or the relationships between
employers and management. Using the LOGISTIC regression
technique, their empirical investigation involves the employment
of both qualitative endogenous and exogenous variables.
Although they have findings that good communication between
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management and the labour force produces improved firm
performance, which is supportive of some of the US and UK
evidence, the lack of a readily definable productivity measure
appears to limit this study's relevance in the broader debate on
the impact of unionised labour on firm performance.
Perhaps in the Australian context one further type of
investigation requires attention; the specific industry/firm or
production line case study approach based on microeconomic
data. Lansbury (1992) attempted a case study of the vehicle
component industry, focusing on one part of the output and
comparing this with a Swedish plant. Lansbury's methodology, in
part, echoes that of the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE), (see
for instance, BIE 1990; 1991) by using the international
comparative case study approach. The significant benefit of such
a study is that it allows for an in-depth focus on microeconomic
factors, conceivably though its weakness is also its strength as
macroeconomic factors are somewhat excluded from the
investigation. However Lansbury does acknowledge the effects of
a significant macroeconomic factor in the recession of 1991-92 on
firm level performance. A positive feature of this study is that
real measures of input and output (or close proxies) are used
allowing for less contentious productivity analysis. The scope of
the relevance of such an approach to other firms or other
industries is somewhat limited, although as a more general
commentary on microeconomic factors affecting output and firm
performance this type of study has much to offer.
In summary, the Australian literature in this field is still in a
developmental state, although this does not preclude the
possibility that research outcomes can provide a valuable lesson
for policy makers. All Australian studies have their problems and
in essence these may be grouped into two categories. Firstly, the
data from which the analysis has originated may not provide an
accurate picture of the actual circumstances found at firm or
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industry levels. Secondly, all important determinants of firm
performance need to be included in the analysis so as to not
produce any unnecessary bias. This has not always been the case
in the Australian work to date. Our research aims to improve on
the second of these failings by including demand side factors,
while rectifying the first problem by including actual firm
performance information rather than subjective managerial
derived opinions.
3. E N G L E -G R A N G E R T W O -S T E P E S T IM A T IO N O F U N IO N
E FFE C T S

In this section we derive long run and dynamic responses of the
performance of the ABC industry to shocks in union density. The
estimates are undertaken using the Engle-Granger (1987) two-step
procedure, which proceeds by estimating a long run static
(cointegrating) regression, and then uses the vector of long run
coefficient estimates to determine the dynamics of the adjustment
to long run equilibrium. Prior to applying the Engle-Granger
procedure we examine the stationarity properties of the data.
T h e A rg u m ents to b e U sed

In order to examine the performance of the ABC industry we use
as a proxy the level of output in that industry, or more
specifically the 1984-85 constant dollar value of building work
done measured in units of millions of dollars. In order to explain
this performance we employ as regressors actual average weekly
earnings in the ABC industry, an index (1984-85 = 100) of the
price of materials used in that industry, the rental cost of capital
proxied by the rate of interest levied on the borrowings of larger
firms, the cost of borrowed finance for residential construction
(demand-driven variable affecting the demand for housing
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construction), Australian real Gross Domestic Product (current
dollars), union density measured in percentage terms, the number
of overtime hours worked, and the number of days lost as a result
of industrial disputation.
Let us now justify the use of the above mentioned explanatory
arguments. Consider a simplified model of the building and
construction industry in Australia. Suppose that this industry is
imperfectly competitive, consisting of a number of large firms and
a number of small firms. Each firm has production technology
which is described by the following general function:
qi = q;(L, M, K),
where L is the total number of labour units employed by firm i, M
is the quantity of materials employed, and K is the quantity of
capital employed. If we imagine that there are two types of labour
units employed by the large and small firms, namely unionised,
Lu, and non-unionised, Lnu, then the production technology
becomes:
qi = q;(Lu + Lnu, M, K).
In order to analyse the effects of union density, U = Lu/ (Lu +
Lnu) on output of the industry as a whole, Q, some of the
aforementioned studies, such as Freeman and Medoff (1984),
concentrate solely on the production function effects of changes in
UD, that is, they simply examine the effects of changes in U on q;.
Such studies neglect to incorporate information about demand.
Let us now consider what we would expect as a typical inverse
demand function in the case of the ABC industry:
P = P(Q, Y, rH),
where th is the cost of borrowing money for the purpose of
purchasing building and construction output (including the
purchase of a house), Y is national income and P is an index of
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the price of output in the ABC industry. Consider the problem of
a representative large firm (say firm i). If such a firm wishes to
maximise profits the problem is:
Max n = P(q.i, q,(Lu + Lnu, M, K), Y, rH)qi
- w(Lu + Lnu) - fj^K - Pm.M.
where the exogenous variables of the problem are q_; which is the
vector of outputs of all the other firms in the industry, w is the
unionised and non-unionised wage rate, rK is the rental cost of
capital and Pm is the price of materials.
In solving this problem for the choice variables Lu, Lnu/ M, and
K we obtain the factor demand functions (assuming solutions
exist):
Lu = LU(Y, rH, w, rK/ Pm),
Lnu

~ Lnu(Y, rH/ W , Tk,

P m )/

M = M(Y, rH, W , rK, Pm)/
K = K(Y, rH/ w, rK/ Pm).
The representative firm's supply function becomes:
qi = qi(Y rH, w, rK, Pm),
or if we aggregate across firms we obtain:
Q = Q(Y, rH, w, no, Pm)What we have not included in this analysis are industrial
relations/labour productivity related factors, including the effects
of union density, overtime hours worked, O and industrial
disputation, I. If we augment our supply function with such
factors we obtain:
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Q - Q(Y, rH, w, rK, Pm, U, O, I).
This is the general form of the function employed in this study in
order to explain the performance of the ABC industry. If we
assume that the form of the function is linear then we obtain our
industrial performance specification:
Q = a0 + axY + a2rH + a3w + a4rK + a5Pm + a6U
+ sljO + a§I + e,
where e is the disturbance term.
In order to estimate our industrial performance specification,
the data used is quarterly and extends from September 1982 to
June 1994, which is the period over which the d ata is av ailab le.
Prior to estimating the specification, however, we need to conduct
unit root tests.
Unit Root Tests
Dickey-Fuller tests for the existence of unit roots are presented in
Table 1, where Q is ABC industry output, w is the level of
average weekly earnings in the industry, r^ is the rental cost of
capital, Pm is a price index of materials used in the ABC industry,
U is the percentage of union density in the industry, Y is the level
of real Australian GDP, th is the cost of borrowing housing
finance, O is the number of overtime hours worked and I is the
number of days lost as a result of industrial disputation. The
optimal lag length in the Dickey-Fuller tests is found by consulting
t-values and the Durbin-h or Durbin-Watson statistic (to
determine whether the specification from which the unit root
statistic is obtained is acceptable). Our results indicate that
variables are either 1(0) (integrated of order zero and hence
stationary in levels) or 1(1) (integrated of order 1 and hence
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stationary in first differences).2 This implies that a long
relationship will be present as long as the 1(0) variables and
1(1) variables are cointegrated. The presence of a long
relationship will be reflected in the stationarity properties of
residual term which will be determined once the long
regression has been estimated.

run
the
run
the
run

Table 1
Dickey-Fuller Tests

Variable

Levels

Q
w
rK
Pm

-2.930
-3.045
-3.512
-1.233

u
th

-0.865
-0.533
-4.324

I
O

-3.774
-3.550

Y

First
Difference

Order of
Integration

-5.455
-5.535

1(1)
1(1)
1(0)
1(1)

-5.826
-6.343
-6.027

1(1)
1(1)
1(0)
1(0)
1(0)

Estimates of the Long Run Coefficients (b Vector)
OLS estimates of the long run cointegrating vector for ABC
industry output is given in Table 2 below along with standard
diagnostic measures and absolute t-values. Critical values at the

2 The critical values are those associated with the unit root
regression with constant and trend, equal to -3.50 at the 5%
level (T=50), (Fuller 1976 pp. 373).
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5% level are given in parentheses, where relevant, for the
diagnostic statistics.
The Dickey-Fuller statistic for the existence of a cointegrating
relationship is -5.469 with 5% critical value equal to -4.76 (Engle
& Yoo 1987), while the cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson
statistic is 1.969 with 5% critical value equal to 1.28, thus both
tests support the existence of a long run relationship, and hence
we are permitted to interpret the coefficient estimates as long run
responses.
The results in Table 2 indicate that five out of eight variables
are significant at the 5% level (6 at the 10% level) and they all,
arguably, have the correct sign, where the sign associated with tk
is ambiguous for the following reasons. The variable r^ represents
either the cost of borrowing for the purpose of purchasing capital
or the return to investing residual profits in interest earning
ventures. The first option will generate a negative effect on output
and the second will cause a positive effect. The fact that we
obtained a positive effect implies that the cost of capital effect is,
perhaps, dominated by the interest earning effects. The remaining
diagnostics such as the coefficient stability tests, (CUSUM and
CUSUMQ), the serial correlation test, (CRDW), the test for
normality, (Jarque-Bera), for heteroskedasticity, (Breusch-PaganGodfrey), and the general misspecification/functional form test,
(RESET), reveal a healthy estimated specification from which, as
a result, we can obtain accurate estimates of coefficients and tests
of significance.
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Table 2
OLS Estimates of the Long Run Coefficients

Variable

Coefficient

Absolute T-Value

Constant
w

45.922
-1.1707
142.29
-96.572

0.1226
0.1753
2.253*
0.9645

Pm

0.00663
506.31
0.2051
-121.89

1.769**
2.009*
3.501*
2.423*

u

132.2

4.032*

Tk
th

I
O
Y

*

Significant at the 5 % level.

**

Significant at the 10% level.

R 2 = 0.9279, CRDW = 1.969 (1.28), Jarque-Bera = 1.3204 (5.99)
RESET(2) = 0.0205 (4.15), Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey = 6.333 (9.488)
CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistics within boundaries.

The most important result is the coefficient estimate on union
density, which sign ificantly implies that a more densely
unionised ABC industry will cause an increase in the output of
that industry contrary to the classical predictions. Specifically,
the coefficient indicates that a 1% rise in union density causes an
increase in output by $132 million. More generally, this result
suggests that the more contemporary models of union behaviour
may have some empirical validity, in that the empirical results
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show that a more unionised sector causes an improvement in the
economic performance of that sector.
This estimate of the relationship between union density and
industry output is relatively precise for small movements in the
level of union density. In the case of taking the change in union
density to its extremes, for instance, examining the effect of 100%
or 0% union density on ABC industry output, the estimated
coefficient obtained in our specification is less useful by virtue of
the fact that the extreme values are well outside the values
considered by our empirical specification. As a consequence,
attempts to use our model for forecasting extreme values of union
density should be taken cautiously.
4. DISCUSSION
So why is there an observed positive relationship between unions
and output in the building and construction industry of
Australia? The following observations/explanations seek more to
generate debate then to unequivocally identify the reasons behind
the calculated positive relationship.
The relatively itinerant nature of employment relationships
within the industry may help to explain our results. Workers
move from job to job depending on the availability of work,
although this does not necessarily mean that they leave the
industry or are more likely to exit in comparison to employees in
other industries (A.B.S. Cat. No. 6209.0, various issues of the
period under investigation). Significant labour mobility (shifting
between jobs before the work is completed), be it voluntary or
involuntary, may have a deleterious effect on output. Thus, there
is an incentive to both employers and employees to reduce the
costly effect of exit. Were a union to have an impact in the
reduction of labour mobility or dis-satisfaction, then it is quite
conceivable that unions could have a positive effect on output.
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It is therefore argued that an effective union is a regulating
influence on the labour market. A 'web of rules', both procedural
and substantive, help to reduce uncertainty in the minds of labour
and thus lower the exit related actions of that labour. Localised
(one site) sets of rules would have little effect, although with some
degree of standardisation of work conditions and remuneration
over many job sites, a reduction in the exit incentive would exist.
The awards associated with the building and construction trades
go some way to providing a standardising influence on the
conditions of employment. In conclusion, regulation of the labour
market on one hand may be seen as a market imperfection yet on
the other, may actually aid the production process by stabilising a
construction site's workforce.
Delays to construction activity would conceivably lower
output for any given period. The union induced strike is an
obvious source of delay, yet it is actually inclement weather that
is the major disruption in building and construction activity. By
contrast the use of the strike or other overt industrial action
accounted for very little of the extensions to construction time. In
the case of General building projects, which sees a greater
proportion of unionisation than the Cottage building sector (The
Royal Commission into Productivity in the Building Industry of
New South Wales 1991a, pp. 23-4; 1991b, pp. 12-3), industrial
action caused 8% of all building and construction delays
compared to 49% for inclement weather.3 Our findings support
this observed minor relationship; that there is no significant
association between strike activity and output (refer to Table 2.).
The question needing to be answered is "Is the strike such a
destructive weapon?". We argue that strike activity, and
industrial disputation in general, may indeed benefit the industry
3

Due to space considerations the union's strict interpretation
inclement weather cannot be covered in detail here.
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of

since without this voice (the strike), dis-satisfaction or exit takes
place. Voice though, is only affective when the employer can hear
it, and 'productive' dialogue between employees and employers is
an indication that employee voice is being heard. Therefore to
reduce both turnover and costly over-runs, it is in the interest of
employers engaged in ’productive1 dialogue to have matters
regarding the employment contract settled before work takes
place at a site. As a consequence, we argue that the negotiation of
such a contract is best handled through the union which may
negotiate on behalf of all workers and in turn, the union will help
to enforce the agreement. Additionally, the same union will act as
a part overseer of work to help ensure a timely delivery of
product (output).
The much reported industrial militancy of unions in the ABC
industry in the early to mid 1980’s may actually have benefited
the industry by forcing the parties to the negotiation table in order
to secure stable workplace and industry agreements. Perhaps a
shock effect has operated here (Hirschman 1970; Freeman &
Medoff 1984). Reports published by the Parliament House
Construction Authority and the Darling Harbour Authority
suggest that improved labour output and a reduction in disputes
will occur when both the employer and employee know exactly
(within reason) what is each party's responsibility (Royal
Commission Into Productivity in the Building Industry of New
South Wales 1992 pp. 158-9). What is seen here, with the
negotiation of work agreements and the adhering to them, is
perhaps an indication of an employment relationship with
attributes that may be explained by the somewhat nebulous
expression, 'good industrial relations'. And although we do not
model proxies of 'good' or for that matter 'bad' industrial
relations, we tentatively make the assumption that 'good'
industrial relations exist in the industry given our findings of a
positive connection between unions and output. This may be the

- 19 -

feature that we are picking up in the results, which would be quite
supportive of the notions advanced by Metcalf (1988), Turnbull
(1991), Freeman and Medoff (1984), and Belman (1992) amongst
others.
The influence of factors outside of the control of both
employees and employers could also have contributed to the
result that we have observed. The general state of the economy,
which in turn affects most domestic industries is one such factor.
Another possible factor may be the recent historical high rates of
unemployment. They could affect the way in which employees
and employers interact, with unions not so much pushing for
better terms and conditions of employment as engaging in
concession bargaining or at least consolidating past gains. Unions
may have found it prudent to negotiate clear labour relations
contracts and thus set procedural and substantive rules of
employment in order to sure up support for the employment of
their members on building and construction sites. This is set
within a more uncertain environment for trade unions where,
increasingly, employers have looked to private hiring halls and the
like which may or may not use unionised labour (Underhill and
Kelly 1993). This employer initiative surely places pressure on
unions to not 'rock the boat' or provide employers with an even
greater incentive to search for non-traditional (non-unionised, or
non-affiliated) labour.
And finally, legislative requirements and the role of wage
setting principles should not be overlooked here either, as it is
quite conceivable that the influence of the Restructuring and
Efficiency Principles and the Structural Efficiency Principles
aided the development of greater dialogue between labour and
capital throughout half of the period under observation. This in
turn promoted a closer understanding of the pressures each have
and are facing.
Our model did not allow for an exact explanation of why
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unions improve the output performance of the industry. And we
can not help but agree with Allen (1986) (even though the focus of
the studies differ slightly, with Allen examining productivity and
ours looking at one component of productivity), when he states
that:
even w ith relatively detailed data it is very difficult to id en tify
precisely the sources of union-nonunion productivity differences.

Allen 1986, p. 197

Relatively detailed data did not exist for our study, so we are
only left with a more speculative approach to explaining the
mechanisms associated with the positive union effect.
Having never been the intention of this paper to exactly
explain the employment relationship dynamics associated with
our findings, the above can in no way be considered an exhaustive
catalogue of reasons associated with our results. Our model
sought to explain output through the use of a number of
explanatory variables, and not just the union density figure. We
believe that the union density variable is not just representative of
the percentage of workers that are unionised, but is also an
indication of a wider and more complex set of labour/capital
interactions.
Estimates of the Dynamic Response by ABC Industry Output
In order to estimate how ABC industry output responds to
exogenous shocks in the short nm, we use the Engle-Granger two
step procedure, the first step of this procedure already completed
through the estimation of the long run regression above. This
method involves estimating the following specification:
k

AQt = bo + biet-i + I
2=1
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afAZf-j + vt,

where Z is a vector of all of the variables (both endogenous and
exogenous) in the model, e is the residual from the static
(cointegrating) regression, and v is a disturbance term satisfying
the classical assumptions. The lag k for the Engle-Granger
dynamic specification is selected to be 2 based on using Sims'
(1980) adjusted LR test, resulting in the estimated specification
given in Table 3.
The important coefficient estimate is that associated with the
residual term, -1.0577, which provides information about the
dynamic response to equilibrium. Since the result is close to unity,
this implies that there is an almost instantaneous adjustment to
equilibrium in response to a shock in an exogenous variable. Thus
for instance, in the case of a 1% increase in union density in
period t, the response by the ABC industry output is to rise by
$132 million in period t without any lagged response.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the effect on an industry's performance,
proxied by output, of having a heavily unionised labour force. In
theory, there are two general schools of thought in terms of
analysing these effects. The old school argues, correctly, that a
union will push for above competitive wage demands which will
drive employment lower than what would be the case under the
competitive outcome, which in turn causes lower output and
profits. The new school believes that this view is too narrow,
neglecting important considerations associated with union groups
avoiding unnecessary labour turnover, allowing cohesive,
consensus-type bargaining, and transmitting important human
capital-augmenting information to unionised members, thus
enhancing labour productivity. An empirical investigation into the
ABC industry, a relatively heavily unionised sector of the
Australian economy, shows that a 1% increase in unionisation
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causes a $132 million gain in long run output for that industry.
The short run dynamics reveal that a shock to union density in
quarter t flows through to output entirely in t, with no
adjustments occurring thereafter.

Table 3
Estimates of the Dynamic Response

Variable
et-2
AQu
Awt-i
Arm -1
ArKt-1
Alt. i
AOm
AUm
AYt-i
APmt-1
AQt-2
Awt-2

ArHt-2
ArKt-2
Alt-2
AOt-2
AUt-2
AYt-2
APmt-2

Coefficient

Absolute T-Value

-1.0577
0.10898
-6.1649
583. 94
142.21
-0.00201
-824.25
-105.58
0.03337
-90.405
0.2358
-8.9943
9.5693
-224.87
-0.00016
-188.33
-188.99
-0.06287
206.82

2.634
0.3585
0.7488
2.454
1.715
0.5725
2.776
0.2428
0.2437
0.3594
1.114
1.094
0.0399
2.304
0.05343
0.5934
0.5635
0.4433
1.001
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